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On 17 June 1999, the final version of 
the Financial Services and Markets Bill 
was published and the Bill is expected to 
become law around the summer of 2000. 
Apart from the assumption by the 
Financial Services Authority (FSA) ot the 
authorisation and regulation of all 
financial services activity, the measure that 
has attracted most attention has been that 
relating to penalties for market abuse.
The term 'market abuse' seems quite 
wide, but its definition for the purpose of 
the Bill is really quite narrow: the 
conditions laid down in clause 95(2) are 
such that it reallv covers only insider 
dealing, market manipulation and 
misleading investors. Other forms of 
behaviour, for example fraud or money 
laundering, although they may involve 
financial markets and be considered 
abusive, do not come within the Bill's 
definition.
At present market abuse is dealt with 
in two ways. Insider dealing and 
misleading statements and practices are 
criminal offences and may be prosecuted 
accordingly by the Crown Prosecution 
Service or, where the misleading 
statement or practice constitutes serious 
fraud, by the Serious Fraud Office (SFO). 
In addition, they are all prohibited under 
the rules of the various SROs (self- 
regulatory bodies) and RPBs (recognised 
professional bodies), which will continue 
to carry out their present functions until 
the Bill becomes law. Nevertheless, the
rules on this vary from one body to 
another: the Law Society Rules, for 
example, do not prohibit insider dealing 
in terms.
Under the new regime the above 
criminal and regulatory routes will both 
still apply. Those forms of market abuse 
that are criminal offences will continue 
to be such; the offence of making 
misleading statements under s. 47 of the 
Financial Services Act 1986 is re-created in 
clause 341 of the Bill while Part V of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993, which covers 
insider dealing, will remain in force. 
Similarly, although the FSA, which will 
take over the functions of the current 
SROs and (in so far as they apply to 
financial services) RPBs, has yet to 
publish its rules, it is certain that those 
activities which are currently prohibited 
and subject to disciplinary sanctions 
under the rules of the SROs will be dealt 
with in a similar 
manner by the 
FSA.
'This clause [ie. clause 98] allows the 
Authority to impose a monetary penalty on 
any person, whether an authorised person or 
not, who has engaged in market abuse or 
induced another to engage in market abuse.'
The power is thus very different in 
nature from the existing power of an 
SRO or RPB to fine its members for 
regulatory breaches, including those 
amounting to market abuse.
All of this is now well-known and has 
been widely discussed. There has been 
rather less discussion however on the 
potential overlap between this new civil 
(or quasi-civil) jurisdiction and the 
criminal law. Since the forms of market 
abuse as defined in the Bill are criminal 
offences, a person could commit an act 
that on the face of it renders him liable to 
both criminal prosecution and a penalty 
from the FSA.
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In addition, 
however, the FSA 
will have the power 
to impose financial 
'penalties' for 
market abuse. The earlier draft of the 
Bill, published as part of the 
Consultation Paper, referred to 'civil 
fines' and it would seem clear that that is 
what they are. They may be compared to 
the fines which, for example, the French 
Commission des Operations de Bourse 
(COB) or the US Securities and 
Exchange Commission (SEC) may 
impose. Although they are arguably 
administrative in nature, in so far as the 
FSA will have the power to impose them 
directly rather than bringing an action 
before the courts, they have two 
important characteristics that mark them 
out as civil. First, they may be enforced as 
a judgment debt. Secondly, and more 
fundamentally, they apply to everyone 
and not simply authorised persons. 
Paragraph 168 of the Guidance Notes to 
the Bill states:
Copies of the Financial Services and Markets Bill are available 
from the Stationery Office, price £13.40, or can be directly 
accessed on the internet at this website.
It has been suggested in some quarters 
that, in practice, one or other 
enforcement route will be taken, but not 
both. Clause 105 states that the Treasurv 
may issue written guidance to assist the 
relevant authorities to determine what 
action to take in cases of overlap, ie. 
where an act appears to be punishable 
with a penalty under clause 98 but also 
constitutes the criminal offence of 
insider dealing under Part V of the 
Criminal Justice Act 1993 or making a 
misleading statement under clause 341 ot 
the Bill. Paragraph 174 of the 
Explanatory Notes, commenting on 
clause 105, seems to imply that a person 
would not be subject to both forms of 
enforcement, stating:
'The purpose of this guidance would be to 
help those authorities in deciding whether a
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ca.se should be subject to criminal prosecution, 
or the imposition of penalties under the market 
abuse provisions.'
No guidance from the Treasury has, 
however, as yet been published, although 
this may simply be due to the fact that 
the new regime will not come into force 
until next year. In any case, the question 
arises as to what extent this guidance will 
be legally binding: if it is mere guidance, 
the FSA (who will have the power to 
bring prosecutions for insider dealing) or 
the Crown Prosecution Service may be 
free to disregard it. The general
o o
assumption that no one could ever both 
be prosecuted and suffer the imposition 
of civil fines is a dangerous one. In
o
France, for example, insider dealing is, as 
in the UK, prohibited under both the 
criminal law (Article 10-1 of Ordinance 
67-833 of 28 September 1967 (as 
amended)) and an administrative 
regulation (COB Regulation 90-08). It is 
rare for a given case to be dealt with and 
punished under both provisions, but it 
has been known, notably in the case of
Delalande/Synthelabo, in which a director 
through insider dealing made a profit
O O 1
estimated at FF69.5m (approx. £7m). 
Following proceedings under the COB 
regulation, in which he was fined the 
maximum penalty of FFlOm (approx. 
£lm), the director was then also 
prosecuted under the Ordinance. 
Although, in the event, the court
o
imposed no further penalty other than to 
order that he pay the costs of the hearing, 
the principle had clearly been established 
that regulatory proceedings of this type 
do not automatically rule out a criminal 
prosecution. Since the FSA is arguably a 
unitary authority modelled on those of 
other jurisdictions, such as the COB, it 
may well be that in time such principles 
are adopted in the UK as well.
Clause 99 of the Bill requires the FSA 
to publish a statement of its policy in 
relation to the imposition of penalties for 
market abuse. Sub-clause (2) makes 
clear, however, that the FSA is 
empowered to alter or replace that policy 
should it see fit, although if it does so it
must publish the replacement or 
alterations. It is not clear, however, what 
redress a person fined by the FSA other 
than under the published policy would 
have. There would arguably be grounds 
for judicial review on the basis that, 
whether or not it was actually illegal, it 
might be unreasonable for the FSA, 
having published a policy in accordance 
with its legal obligations, then to depart 
from it. Nevertheless the possibility 
cannot be ruled out that the Divisional 
Court might be less than sympathetic to a 
person who had recently been convicted 
of insider dealing or misleading investors.
o o
To conclude, much remains unclear at 
this stage. It may well be that only a series 
of test cases will ultimately show the 
extent to which criminal prosecutions 
and civil fines may run in parallel. @
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Medicinal products and essential similarity: the preliminary ruling in 
R v Medicines Control Agency ex parte Generics
by Frank Wooldridge
The Community legislation concerningJ o o
the authorisation of medicinal products is 
of considerable complexity. However, the 
European Court of Justice (ECJ) has 
recently elucidated the controversial 
meaning of the concept of 'essential 
similarity' in its recent decision in R v 
Medicines Control Agency ex pane Generics
(Case C-368/96, not yet reported). It 
will be impossible to understand this 
ruling without some elementary 
understanding of the relevant provisions 
of the applicable Community' legislation.
According to Council Regulation 
2309/93 (OJ 1993 L214/1), 
authorisations of certain medicinal 
products must take place at Community 
level. Other such products require 
authorisation by the competent authority 
of the relevant member state (in this case 
the Licensing Authority established by 
the Medicines Act 1968, acting by means of 
the Medicines Control Agency) before 
they can be marketed, in accordance with 
the provisions of Council Directive 65/65 
(OJ 1965-1966, Eng. Spec. Ed., p. 20), 
subsequently amended by Council 
Directive 75/318 (OJ 1975 El47/1),
Council Directive 87/21 (OJ 1987 
115/36), Council Directive 93/39 (OJ 
1993 L214/22) and Commission 
Regulation 541/95 (OJ 1995 E55/7).
An application for authorisation is 
required by art. 4(2).8 of Council 
Directive 6S/65/ (as amended) to be 
accompanied by the results of certain 
tests and clinical trials (which generally 
involve the use of humans or animals). 
However, the applicant is not required to 
provide the results of pharmacological 
and toxicological tests or the results of 
clinical trials under three circumstances. 
Thus, art. 4(2).8(a)(iii) provides that 
such results are not required if the 
applicant can demonstrate that the 
product is essentially similar to one 
which has already been authorised within 
the Community for six or ten years and
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